Public-key digital certificates are being used in public key infrastructure to provide authentication of the user's public key. Public key digital certificates like X.509 are used to bind a public key to its user. This kind of certificates cannot be used for user authentication. Such use may lead to forgery of user's identity. Lein et al proposed a authentication scheme based on Generalized Digital Certificates (GDC). A GDC consists of user's public information like digital birth certificate, digital identity, etc. and the digital signature of trusted third party generated from that public information. The GDC based scheme provides user authentication and allows for session key establishment. The scheme is secure against forgery of user's identity but it does not provide mutual authentication. The scheme proposed in this paper not only provides mutual authentication and session key but also it preserves the security strength of Lein et al's GDC based scheme. Index Terms-PKI, public key digital certificate, generalized digital certificate, identity forgery, authentication and session key. science and engineering from Mahatma Gandhi Mission's College of Engineering, Nanded (M. S.), India in 2009. He received his
I. INTRODUCTION
Public key digital certificate consists of a public key of certificate holder, name, period of validity, algorithm, etc. and digital signature generated for this public key [18] . The digital signature is generated by trusted third party normally certifying authority (CA). "X.509" is an example of public key digital certificate [1] . In PKI X.509 certificate is widely used to provide authentication of Certificate holder's public key. If a certificate holder proves that he has knowledge of the private key associated with the public key specified in the X.509 digital certificate the certificate holder is authenticated otherwise not.
But there is a security flaw identified in this mechanism. As all fields present in public key digital certificate are public, if a malicious receiver obtains public key digital certificate, then he can forge the identity of the certificate holder. If a certificate holder H needs to send a message M to J, then H will create a message M and put his digital signature SIGN H on it using private key PR H and encrypts it by using the public key PU J and then forwards this digitally signed and encrypted message to J. J will decrypt it using J's private key PR J . Then J will verify the digital signature SIGN H of certificate holder H . For this J needs a public key PU H of H which is obtained from public key digital certificate of H. If the digital signature SIGN H of H verified correctly, then J comes to know that the message received is really coming from H. If receiver J is not trustworthy, then he can encrypt the digitally signed message by H using public key PU X of other user X and forwards this message to X. Then X will decrypt it using its private key PR X . X finds a digital signature SIGN H [2] . Generalized digital certificates are used to authenticate the certificate holder and establish a secret session key at each end of communication using any type of digitized general certificate like digital unique identity certificate, digital passport, digital school certificate, etc. A GDC consists of general and public information of the certificate holder and digital signature of this public information generated by certifying authority. GDC is never sent to the receiver and the signature of GDC will not be sent to the receiver in plain text. Rather GDC holder will have to respond to the challenge sent by the receiver.
In the GDC based scheme [2] , only GDC holder is verified and a secret session key gets established upon successful authentication for subsequent communication. But there is no provision for sender to check the authenticity of the verifier. The proposed scheme described in this paper uses the concept of GDC and achieves mutual authentication along with session key establishment.
Digital Certificate application involves following three entities.
i. Certifying Authority (CA): is a third party which can be trusted by all others. CA can be an organization or a person who can create a digital signature using its private key PR CA . The X.509 public key digital certificate contains the public key of the certificate holder and digital signature of CA for this public key. The GDC consist of public information of certificate holder in the general form of certificate like digital unique identity certificate, digital passport, digital school certificate etc. and digital signature of CA for this public information. But there will be no public key present in GDC. ii. GDC-Owner: is a person who receives the GDC for his public information from a trusted CA through a secure communication. In order to get authenticated and establish a secret session key this GDC-Owner needs to present a valid response to the challenge generated by GDC-verifier. iii. GDC-Verifier: is a person with whom GDC-Owner wishes to establish a secure communication. GDC-Verifier sends a challenge to the GDC-Owner and verifies the response using received public information from GDC-Owner and public key of the CA.
The entire GDC is never sent to the GDC-Verifier instead the GDC-Owner will simply send the public information for which he or she obtained the digital signature from the CA. The digital signatures of GDC need not to be sent to the GDC-Verifier. The digital signature becomes a security factor on the basis of which user can be authenticated [2] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II an overview of the related work is given. Section III consists of proposed DL-based scheme and its security analysis. In Section IV the proposed IF-based protocol and its security analysis is discussed. Section V consists of the conclusion which is followed by references.
II. RELATED WORK
Authentication is one of the most important services of security. Managing a key is also an important aspect of establishing a secure communication. A number of efforts have been taken to improve these services. Most of the techniques make use of public key digital certificates.
A receiver can validate the authenticity of a received message by validating the digital signature of the receiver. For this purpose Public key digital certificates are used. But this scheme may violate the privacy of a signer if receiver decides as explained previously.
Efforts have been taken for solving this issue with the introduction of signature scheme that will not depend on digital certificates for the verification of signatures [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] . In [15] concept of signatures that do not require certificates are proposed which uses benefits of ID based cryptography and it can be widely used in applications where there is less bandwidth like wireless applications [16] . This scheme has a drawback of the key escrow problem.
Another attempt was made to solve the issue of privacy violation in [8] with the help of Identity based cryptography in which identity of user like name or email address will be used as a public key. But it is limited to the situation in which user knows the identity of his communication partner.
Introduction of Generalized digital certificate [2] solves the problem of violation of user's privacy. It is used to authenticate the certificate owner and establish a session key with communication partner. Generalized digital certificate consist of public information like digital birth certificate, school certificate, identity etc. of GDCowner. The Generalized digital certificate is used to authenticate the GDC-owner by using challenge and response mechanism in which information of digital signature will be passed as a secret token. Generalized digital certificates provide only one way authentication. Both communication partners can't be authenticated at once. If we authenticate a GDC-owner and after successful authentication if the same procedure is used by the user at the other end, then for his successful authentication it will take again four steps of the protocol described in [2] . For this step of the protocol in [2] will be doubled. At the end there will be two session keys.
Attempts have been taken in improving the Generalized Digital Certificate based communication [4] [5] [6] . In [4] This will be continued until the session expires. But this scheme also works to achieve one way authentication.
In [5] data security is increased by use of AES. It is also based on one way authentication. Similar kind of work is found in [6] with an additional security feature but it is again based on one way authentication.
The proposed work consists modifications to Lein et al's Discrete log based scheme (DL-based scheme) and Integer Factorization based scheme (IF-based scheme) in order to provide mutual authentication and subsequent session key establishment.
III. DL-BASED SCHEME
In day to day life individuals are identified on the basis of ID-card issued by a trusted authority. The ID-card consists of name, date of birth, address etc. and photograph. The authority put a stamp and signature on photograph and ID-card. If a person produces an ID-card and matches with the photo on the card, then he or she is successfully identified. In this scheme, it is very difficult to forge signatures. So owning an ID-card (paper certificate) is the key factor in the process of identification.
The schemes described in this paper introduce a similar approach for identification of both individuals (one who is being verified and the other who is verifying). In the digital world, both individuals one who is being verified and other who is verifying present at far ends so authentication of both parties becomes important. In this new scheme, there is no need to transfer entire GDC to each other for authentication of each other rather a valid response to received challenge needs to be generated. Finally, on successful authentication of both individuals a secret session key is generated.
Like GDC the proposed protocol is based on the combination of traditional discrete log based ElGamal digital signature [3] and the famous Diffie-Hellman Assumption [9] .
A. ElGamal Digital Signature
In the ElGamal scheme [3] a large prime number Q and its primitive root α is supposed to be shared by all the users [20] . The signer selects at random a private key X such that and computes corresponding public key . The signer then selects a random secrete k excluding 1 and Q-1 such that and computes
. Then S1 is solved by using the signer's secrete X, and k, as
Where D represents the message digest of the message . The digital signature of the message is defined as a pair (R1, S1). The signature is verified by checking whether "(2)" holds true.
(2)
The parameter R1 is computed offline which depends on random integer k. It is independent of the message . So there will be no harm in making it public, but the parameter S1 depends on the user's statement . So S1 should be kept secret. There are a number of variants of ElGamal Signature [17] .
B. Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Assume U and V have their private keys X U and X V. Their corresponding public keys are and, respectively, where Q is a large prime number and α is its primitive root such that of order Q. Only U and V can compute a shared secret key as DL-Based protocol for Authentication of the user and Establishment of Key (3) Diffie-Hellman Assumption refers to the assumption that is computation of key K U, V from public key Y U or Y V , without knowledge of corresponding X U or X V is computationally infeasible. However, solving the private key X U or X V from the corresponding Y U or Y V is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem.
C. Review of DL-based Authentication and Key Establishment
The scheme consists of two phases [ As stated earlier R1 is made public, but S1 depends on public information M O . So it must be kept secret during and after the process of authentication. The protocol for authenticating and establishing a key is as described below.
ii. Authentication and Key Establishment Protocol:
The protocol takes four steps to complete described as follows:
Step 1:
The After receiving these, verifier needs to verify whether the token received $ O is really generated from the digital signature of Generalized Digital Certificate of O. This can be done by checking whether the following "(5)" holds true.
Where Y is the public key of the certificate authority. If inequality 5 doesn't satisfy then authentication will fail and protocol stops otherwise V will select a random integer Z V such that and computes a challenge and sends to the user O.
Step 3:
The user O uses secret S1 and computes Diffie-Hellman Key and obtains , where represents a key derivation procedure with as an input. O selects a random integer Z O such that and computes a challenge and computes
, where represents a one way keyed hash function with as an input key. The user O then sends and .
Step 4:
User V will receive and . User V uses his secrete and computes Diffie-Hellman Key and obtains , and checks whether is true. If this satisfies then GDC-owner O is successfully authenticated by GDC-verifier V.
Otherwise, authentication fails, and protocol stops. On successful authentication a session key is created.
D. Proposed Dl-Based Scehme
The proposed DL-based scheme provides mutual authentication on the basis of their public information like digital driving license, digital passport, or any digital identity. The proposed scheme consists of two phases:

Registration at Certificate Authority 
Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment
This new scheme is based on discrete logarithm [7] . Solving the problem of discrete logarithm is computationally infeasible.
Select a large prime Q such that Q-1/2 is also a prime number [21] . Find its primitive root α. Prime number Q and α is supposed to be shared by all.
i. Registration At Certificate Authority
Initially, both users need to be registered at certificate authority. Certificate Authority will produce Generalized Digital Certificate for the received public information M O, and M V of user O and V respectively. O receives a signature pair (R1 O, S1 O ) and V receives a signature pair (R1 V, S1 V ) for their public information M O, and M V. The values S1 O, S1 V depends on public information so need to be kept secret.
ii. Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment phase
Authentication and key establishment protocol take five steps as shown below.
The user O needs to compute secrete token from digital signature of receiving Generalized Digital Certificate.
(7)
User O passes his public information and pair (R1 O , $ O ) to the GDC-verifier V.
The user V also computes his secret token from the information received during registration.
Step 2:
The verifier needs to verify whether the token received $ O is really generated from the digital signature of Generalized Digital Certificate of O. This can be done by checking whether "(8)" holds true.
(8)
Where Y is the public key of the certificate authority. If inequality (8) doesn't satisfy then authentication fails and protocol stops otherwise V selects a random integer Z V such that and computes a challenge .
User V sends CV, M'V, (R1V, $V) to O.
User O checks the validity of receiving credentials. This can be done through "(10)".
Where Y is the public key of the certificate authority. If inequality (11) Step 5:
User O computes and O derives another symmetric key
which is used to compute which is used to authenticate V using "(17)". (17) O creates a session key (18) Otherwise, the authentication fails and protocol exits.
Meanwhile, user V creates session key
Where is a shared session key between O and V. In order to get authenticated successfully each user needs to compute the secret token and send public information along with a pair (R1 X , $ X ) to each other. The validity of the digital signature will be checked with the help of "(2)". In which is replaced by secrete token of another user. As every term in "(2)" is public, anyone can validate it, but for successful authentication of user received and computed must match each other and this is possible if and only if is generated by genuine user who have authentic Generalized Digital Certificate because is computed by using a key and which requires secret and secret respectively. And only GDC-Holder can compute session key as security provided by Diffie-Hellman. In this way both parties can authenticate each other.
If a malicious user somehow manages to obtain the public information of V then there is no possibility of forgery attack on the identity of V because V sends challenge in step 2 which is obtained from the use of secret parameters of digital signature of the generalized digital certificate. And computation of secret S1 V from $ V is a discrete logarithmic problem which is infeasible. Also, the computation of session key requires the use of secret parameter S1 of public information M V and this is possible for only genuine user V who owned generalized digital certificate for his public information M V from certificate user.
E. Security Analysis Of Proposed Dl-Based Scehme
The security analysis of the newly introduced scheme is described in this section. The proposed scheme depends on Diffie-Hellman in combination with ElGamal digital signature. The security of his scheme depends on the security of Diffie-Hellman and security of ElGamal scheme. The proposed protocol satisfies the property of unforgeability, one-wayness, and non-transferability. a) Unforgeability: User who knows the digital signature of Generalized Digital Certificate can generate a valid response only. In order to perform a forgery attack, an attacker needs to compute (R1 X , $ X ). If somehow attacker manages to get this pair and his digital signature gets validated by using "(8)" or "(10)". This is possible because all values are public in these equations, attackers need to find out the secrete power S1 of from token $. This is infeasible because of the security provided by discrete logarithm. Then in order to get successfully authenticated attacker needs to present a valid which is infeasible. Only GDC-Holder can obtain the secret parameter S1 from certificate authority which is kept as a secret. Thus UNFORGEABILITY is achieved through the security of Diffie-Hellman in combination with ElGamal digital signature. In this way, the new proposed scheme is secure against Forgery attacks. b) One-wayness: Based on the interactions nobody can derive the digital signature of the certificate. The digital signature of the generalized digital certificate consists of a pair (R1, S1). GDC-Holder is not sending the generalized digital certificate to anybody, S1 will be secure. Instead of sending secret parameter token generated from secret parameter is passed. The computation of secret parameter S1 from $ is infeasible because this is equal to solve problem of discrete logarithm and which is infeasible. If attacker can't obtain secret parameter S1 then he can't respond with correct and protocol stops. In this way the proposed protocol satisfies the property of one-wayness. c) Non-transferability: A response produced for one GDC-Verifier should not be transferred in response to the other GDC-Verifier. Because this will lead to the impersonation of a user. Because of Diffie-Hellman a valid response is generated by GDC-Holder, who knows secrete parameter s1 or by a user who knows the random secret of random challenge. As the user selects a random challenge each time, the response validity is for only one session.
GDC-Holder is not sending the generalized digital certificate to anybody its digital signature will be safe and nobody can transfer complete generalized digital certificate to any other user. In this protocol, there is no problem of privacy intrusion. Therefore a valid response cannot be passed into other GDC-Verifiers challenge.
Step 
USER O USER V

IV. IF-BASED SCHME
This section describes a mutual authentication protocol which is based on the trapdoor hash based online-offline signature scheme and Diffie-Hellman assumption generalized modulo composite number (GDHA) [2] , [22] [23] . The online-offline scheme makes use of the trapdoor hash function that satisfies the property of unforgeability, one-wayness and Non Transferability.
A. Review of IF-based User Authentication And Key Establishment
The protocol consists of two phases [2] : i. Registration At Certificate Authority ii. Authentication and Key Establishment i. Registration at CA:
Certificate owner O sends his public information for registration to the certificate authority (CA). CA creates a GDC by putting his signature, which will be converted into the online-offline signature of the public information received. The CA sends GDC consisting of online-offline signature defined by
The owner is required to keep the secret from others. For verification owner sends a secret token computed from secret parameter .
ii. Authentication and key establishment protocol
The (19) If above inequality doesn't satisfy then authentication fails and protocol stops otherwise V will select a random integer Z V such that and computes a challenge and sends to O.
The Step 4:
V will receive and . V uses his secret and computes Diffie-Hellman Key and obtains , and checks whether (20) If this satisfies then GDC-owner O is successfully authenticated by GDC-verifier V.
B. Proposed IF-based Scheme
The new scheme consists of two phases:
i. Registration at CA:
Initially, both users need to be registered at certificate authority. CA will produce Generalized Digital Certificate for the received public information , and of user O and V respectively. O and V receive GDC having digital signature of the CA described as and respectively. The value , depends on public information so need to be kept secret. Figure 2 shows the mutual authentication protocol for user authentication and key establishment.
ii. Mutual Authentication and key establishment protocol
The user O needs to compute secrete token from digital signature of receiving Generalized Digital Certificate. It is calculated as
User O sends his public information M O and To the GDC-verifier V.
User V also uses his information received from the CA during the registration phase and computes his secret token such that
Step 2:
After receiving these, verifier needs to check the authenticity of the received token and information. Step 5:
To check the authenticity of the received information the owner needs to derive a symmetric key which is obtained as and obtains Create and compare it with If it matches, and then V is authenticated and creates a session key (24) Otherwise, the Authentication fails and the protocol terminates. Meanwhile V creates a session key (25)
C. Security Analysis of Proposed IF-Based Scheme
The IF-based protocol makes use of the GDHA, RSA signature, and online-offline signature based on the hash function. So the security of the scheme depends on the security of the GDHA, RSA signature and online-offline signature scheme. Similar to the security analysis given in section III E for the DL-based protocol, the IF-based scheme also satisfies the property of unforgeability, onewayness and non transferability.
V. CONCLUSION
Public key digital certificates are used for authenticity of public key of a user but it cannot be used for user authentication. Lein et al proposed generalized digital certificates based scheme which can be used to authenticate a user and establish session keys for secure communication. But it does not provide mutual authentication which is essential for many applications. The proposed work consists of modifications to DL-based and IF-based schemes. The proposed schemes not only achieve mutual authentication but also preserves the security strength of the original schemes.
